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Freedom of speech is the most important right persons have in nations claiming to be democratic, respect human rights, and follow the rule of law. Other rights matter little without it. For example, if a government imposes an agricultural policy that causes a colossal famine and ordinary citizens lack freedom of speech to expose and stop it, then whatever economic or subsistence rights those citizens have are negated by this lack.
2 Such a tragedy befell the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 296 [Vol. 26 previous ones and every regular or provisional constitution in China from 1908 to 1946-grants citizens the right of free speech. 10 But citizens exercising this right in the political sphere have met grave problems. 11 10. Since its founding in 1949, the PRC has had four constitutions. The first one was adopted in 1954. Article 87 states that "[c] itizens . . . enjoy freedom of speech . . ." SELECTED LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 51 (Joseph En-pao Wang ed., 1976) . The second one was adopted in 1975. Article 28 grants free speech. Id. at 87. The third one was adopted in 1978. Article 45 grants free speech. It also says that citizens have the right to "speak out freely, air their views fully, hold great debates and write big-character posters." 2 SELECTED LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 164 (Joseph En-pao Wang ed., 1979) . The "four big freedoms" in Article 45 of the 1978 Constitution were repealed by the government two years later after citizens began citing them as legal bases for actions. MERLE GOLDMAN, FROM COMRADE TO CITIZEN: THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS IN CHINA 49 (2005) . But see The "Dazibao": Its Rise and Fall, BEIJING REV., Oct. 6, 1980, at 27-28 , available at http://massline.org/PekingReview/PR1980/PR1980-40.pdf (defending the government's decision to repeal these freedoms). The fourth-and current-Constitution was adopted in 1982. Article 35 states that " [c] itizens . . . enjoy freedom of speech." THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1979 -1982 , at 12 (Legis. Affairs Comm'n of the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong. of the People's Republic of China comp., 1987) . In addition, Article 41 specifically grants citizens the right to criticize the government and not be suppressed or retaliated against. Id. at 13. See generally Benjamin L. Liebman, Article 41 and the Right to Appeal (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 14-407, , available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2492802. Every pre-1954 constitution in China also granted a right to free speech. XIANFA pt. 2, no. 2 (1908) (China); XIANFA art. 6, no. 4 (1912) (China); XIANFA art. 5, no. 4 (1914) (China); XIANFA art. 11 (1923) (China); XIANFA art. 15 (1931) (China); XIANFA art. 11 (1946) (China) [fully implemented on the self-governed Chinese island of Taiwan decades later, but not effective at all on the mainland since 1949]. WILLIAM L. TUNG, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN CHINA 319, 322, 326, 333, 345, 351 (1964) ; ANDREW J. NATHAN, CHINESE DEMOCRACY 108-10 (1986) ; Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan), OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=434. Fifteen years before seizing power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted the Basic Constitutional Program of the Chinese Soviet Republic. It, too, granted a right to free speech (No. 10). THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC, 1931 -1934 , at 124 (W.E. Butler ed., 1983 . At the start of the CCP's first half-decade in power, it adopted the Common Program. This document served as a quasi-constitution until the adoption of the 1954 Constitution and granted a right to free speech (Art. 5). FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA 36 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1962) . So freedom of speech has been legally enshrined-if not always tolerated-in China for over a century.
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11. This is because the PRC's rulers have "always seen these freedoms as conditional on not disturbing political 'stability and unity' and, more importantly, on involving no challenge to the leadership of the CCP." Keith Forster, Dissidents, in DICTIONARY OF THE POLITICS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 84, 84 (Colin Mackerras et al. eds., 1998) . Article 51 of the 1982 Constitution says that the exercise of freedoms and rights may not infringe on the interests of the state, society, collective, or other citizens. The incorporation of vague legal duties like this one in a constitution is quite unusual. Most other nations lack such a provision in their constitutions. LIN FENG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CHINA 278 (2000) . But see Liu Hainian, Freedom of Speech and Social Development, CHINA SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES, 1998, pt. II, http://www. humanrights-china.org/zt/situation/2004020041015102127.htm (arguing that constitutional limits on free speech are not so unusual in other nations). One critic claims that clauses like Article 51 are nonsense and argues "that the question is not that freedom of speech cannot violate the law, 2014] CHINA Three large-scale events involving free speech have occurred since China's reopening 12 to the world in 1978. All three (1978-79, 1986, and 1989) ended when the ruling Communist Party tired of the speakers' criticisms.
13 The first two events ended with mass arrests, show trials, and but that the law cannot violate the freedom of speech." Hu, supra note 2, at 432. China's constitutional right of free speech appears to be only assertive instead of prohibitory against legislative power: "it merely makes a claim that may or may not actually be true." WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE AMERICAN FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (4th ed. 2011). Many nations, such as the United States, view free speech as necessary to protect the individual and society from official corruption. For example, "When someone blows the whistle on government fraud or deceit, the real winners are members of the public, not the whistleblower. Legal protection of whistleblowing is an effort to ensure the free flow of information." SUNSTEIN, supra note 8. The writers of China's numerous constitutions, however, saw things differently: "their purpose was not to protect the individual against the state, but to enable the individual to function more effectively to strengthen the state. This idea of rights as means to a healthy political order was new in China, but it drew on traditional [i.e., classical Confucian] concepts to make sense." NATHAN, supra note 10, at 125. Another major difference is that speech in the PRC is regulated by content and limits imposed by either the legislature or executive (or extra-legally by the CCP) are not subject to judicial review. 
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A recounting of six important free-speech cases throughout Chinese history (3rd-century BCE to the 1990s, withholding direct criticism of the Hu-Wen administration 18 and allowing it to save face) shows why the Party should give ordinary citizens a greater say in public affairs to help fix the nation's chronic legal and political problems and sustain breathtaking economic reforms begun in 1978. Albeit hard, this is the best way for the Party to save itself and avert full-blown social unrest in the short term as well as transform the PRC into more than the world's FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 26 sweatshop by century's end. With free speech and China's current free-speech dilemma now defined, Part II of this Article retells three notable free-speech cases from imperial Chinese history. Part III retells three notable free-speech cases from modern Chinese history. Part IV argues for the toleration of free speech in today's China. And Part V dreams of a future China that tolerates free speech as a truly great nation reinvigorating a wise native practice.
II. A TRIO OF IMPERIAL FREE-SPEECH CASES

A. Case 1: Qin and Li v. Books and Scholars (3rd-century BCE)
The first emperor of a unified China, Qin Shihuang, is infamous for many things, not least of which his harsh punishments 19 and aversion to free speech. He and his prime minister, Li Si, presided over the banning, burning, and almost complete destruction of China's ancient literary heritage during the short-lived Qin dynasty from 221 to 206 BCE. Li believed that free speech begat confusion and chaos thereby weakening the emperor's power. 20 As a result, it had to be destroyed. In ordering the burning of all pre-Qin dynasty historical records, Li said
[a]nyone who ventures to discuss the Odes or Documents [two of the five Confucian Classics] shall be executed in the marketplace. Anyone who uses antiquity to criticize the present shall be executed along with his family. Any official who observes or knows of violations and fails to report them shall be equally guilty. 21 19. If a group of less than five men stole something worth below a certain amount, then they were banished. If they stole something worth more than a certain amount, then they were tattooed, made convict laborers, and had their noses cut off. If a group of at least five men stole something worth more than a certain amount, then they were tattooed, made convict laborers, and had their feet cut off. YÜN-MENG PREFECTURE, HU-PEI PROVINCE, IN 1975 , at 120 (1985 . For a brief survey of the Qin penal system, see id. at 14-18. 20. SIMA QIAN, RECORDS OF THE GRAND HISTORIAN: QIN DYNASTY 54-55, 185 (Burton Watson trans., 1993) (1st-century BCE).
21. Id. at 55. This event, which occurred in 213 BCE, "has come to stand both for the repression of principled dissent and for impiety toward the past . . ." JOHN E. WILLS, JR., MOUNTAIN OF FAME: PORTRAITS IN CHINESE HISTORY 48 (2012) . But see MICHAEL NYLAN, THE FIVE " CONFUCIAN" CLASSICS 29-30 (2001) (doubting that the Qin dynasty targeted the Odes or Documents for destruction). For an article arguing that the book burning was directed against ways of thought better described as "didactic" and "historical" than "philosophical," see Jens 2014] CHINA One lifetime of absolute power was not enough for the first emperor. He sought immortality and hired two scholars to find a way for him to conquer death. But the scholars went into hiding because they felt his greed for authority was unbecoming of someone seeking immortality. After hearing of their disappearance, he ordered an investigation of all scholars and on at least one occasion had 460 of them executed (perhaps buried alive) 22 as a warning to others who might oppose his will.
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The Qin rulers rejected the humaneness of Confucianism in favor of Legalism, a rival philosophy mostly interested in centralizing power, subjugating the individual to the state, standardizing thought, and using brute force. 24 The Qin dynasty's brutality and violence led to its quick demise as well as the official demise of Legalism. All later dynasties adopted one version or another of Confucianism as the official state ideology. But they all shared the Qin's aversion to free speech and adopted similar measures to suppress it. 31. The history of imperial Chinese censors goes back over 2000 years. They began as relatively unimportant secretaries to emperors and could impeach principal officers of the state. Granted greater importance during the Tang dynasty (618-907 CE), censors spoke out fearlessly and served "as the trusted ears and eyes of the emperor and act[ed] against misconduct and maladministration on the part of officials, high and low, central and local." CH'IEN TUAN-SHENG, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF CHINA, 1912 -1949 , at 39 (1970 . They "were in theory given some privileges that other officials did not enjoy. For example, they had freedom of speech . . . and were free from punishment for their performance of official duties." PEI HUANG, AUTOCRACY AT WORK: A STUDY OF THE YUNG-CHENG PERIOD, 1723 -1735 , at 115 (1974 HIST. 30, 33 (1978) ("The Chinese government had invented the Censorate, in some ways an institutional concession to the expression of dissenting opinion, but far more importantly an agency charged with surveillance over the bureaucracy . . ."). In the late imperial era, the impeachment power of censors overtook their ability to dissent, or remonstrate, from emperors and high dignitaries. CH'IEN TUAN-SHENG, supra, at 39-40. For an article about mass dissent by officials, including censors, in Beijing during the mid-Ming, see John W. Dardess, Protesting to the Death: The Fuque in Ming Political History, MING STUD., Jan. 2003 Jan. , at 86 (2003 . See also CHARLES O. HUCKER, THE CENSORIAL SYSTEM OF MING CHINA (1966) for more about the Ming (as well as pre-Ming) censorial heritage. The institution of the Censorate, which originated in ancient China and was later borrowed by neighboring countries, is an invention from Asia's past that contemporary Asian nations could adapt to their modern political systems and might more likely succeed than those transplanted from the West. For example, keeping each official-and not just the organization as a whole-independent and empowering young officials to become internal agents of change within bureaucracies are two 2014] CHINA (and last) ethnic Han Chinese dynasty, the Ming, abolishing by decree the office of prime minister in 1380 because it had been a source of power struggles and political instability since the Qin dynasty. 32 But prime ministers would make a comeback later in Chinese history. One has been characterized as "a loyal prime minister to a doomed dynasty" and another "the most corrupt prime minister in Chinese history."
33
Regarding the imperial Censorate, it has yet to be adapted to the modern era. Educated elites as well as ordinary Chinese lack a similar institutional channel through which they can join peacefully in final political decisions.
C. Case 3: Wei Zhongxian v. Donglin Academy (17th-century CE)
The Donglin Academy was founded during the Song dynasty and later revived in the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644 Qing ( -1911 dynasties. Its influence peaked in the early 1600s before members suffered political persecution at the hands of a powerful eunuch.
35 Donglin was atypical for academies because it operated more as a think tank than a traditional school. Despite numerous imperial edicts prompted by the emperor's prime minister outlawing such activities and private academies in the late 1500s, Donglin reopened in Wuxi (roughly halfway between Nanjing and Shanghai) soon after his death to discuss the political reasons behind the dynasty's decline. Its members practiced orthodox Confucianism via discipline, righteous living, and study.
36 Also, it published annual ways to apply certain ideas behind the design of the Censorate to improve the performance of existing institutions. 38. Chinese eunuchs date back 5000 years. They were voluntarily castrated males who served in various capacities at the royal household. Their castration ensured that the king or emperor did not have to worry about them impregnating his many women, thereby muddying the line of succession. Because they lived with the ruling family, eunuchs enjoyed rare access to power and often improperly influenced royal decision making or usurped power altogether. COMMENTARY (1980) . See also MAO TSE-TUNG, 3 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 69-98 (1967) .
44. A group of them [including the famous female novelist Ding Ling and poet Ai Qing, father of world-renowned contemporary China-based artist Ai Weiwei, supra note 18] had published essays a month or two before in the Party's official literary organ [Liberation Daily] that criticized the apathy, hypocrisy, and bureaucratism of top Party leaders.
Through their criticisms, these writers sought to halt what they considered to be the distortion of Communist ideals in practice and the subordination of the humanitarian values of communism to short-term tactical goals. Their essays revealed a feeling of betrayal by a movement to which they had given themselves in misunderstanding. COMMUNIST CHINA 20-21 (1967 
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1979. Wei responded, If he implements policies that benefit the people and if he leads them to peace and prosperity, we will trust him . . . If he implements policies that are detrimental to the people, and if he follows a dictatorial road and acts contrary to the interests of the people, the people should oppose him.
62
The government promptly arrested and charged him with "counterrevolutionary activities" and divulging military secrets to foreigners. Wei testified at a one-day show trial on October 16 and refused to recant his bold views. Exemplifying a nascent rightsconsciousness among citizens at that time, he invoked the PRC Constitution's free-speech provision.
63 Not persuaded, the court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. He remained there, enduring beatings and long periods of solitary confinement and was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, until being released in 1993 in a bid by the government to host the 2000 Summer Olympics in Beijing. 64 That bid lost. 65 The government re-arrested Wei in 1994 and resentenced him to fourteen years in prison in 1995. 66 Mounting international pressure led to his release and exile (read: banishment, a punishment meted out to various "bad elements" by Chinese rulers dating back to at least the Qin dynasty) 67 to the United States for health reasons 62. Skeel, supra note 60. Unlike almost all other Democracy Wall activists, "Wei warned that without radical political change, Deng would turn out to be a tyrant just like the countless Chinese despots who had preceded him. Without the freedom to criticize and vote, there could be no check on absolute personal power. Wei turned out to be right." BURUMA, supra note 53, at 86. 63. The fourth charge of Wei's indictment claimed that he incited the overthrow of the government by speaking freely for democracy and human rights. He rebutted this charge by arguing that free speech is a constitutional right to be enjoyed by all citizens. In addition, he denied advocating the violent overthrow of the government and explained how quotes of his had been taken out of context by the public prosecutor. WEI, supra note 61, at 
IV. WHY THE PARTY SHOULD TOLERATE FREE SPEECH
A. Cautionary Tales
The sextet of free-speech cases retold above should serve as cautionary tales to the PRC's current leaders that such repressions of criticism and dissent are signs of intellectually backward and frightened governments.
69 Professor Daniel Farber writes that "[r]epression drives dissidents underground, provides them with martyrs, and gives their ideas the attractive aura of the forbidden. Also, dissidents, however bad their ideas, are early warning signs of popular discontent and mounting social problems, alerting the government to the need for reform before events reach a crisis."
70
It is no coincidence that the most technologically advanced, culturally dynamic, and politically stable country in the world today, the United States, is also the one that most tolerates freedom of speech, especially political speech. This kind of speech can be hard to define. "Virtually everything from comic strips to commercial advertisements to even pornography can have a political dimension," writes dean and professor Erwin Chemerinsky. "[The United States'] refusal to narrowly limit the China left the exile still within the country and subject to Chinese authority." Id. at 17 n.12. In modern China, Fang and Wei were de facto banished outside the country in 1990 and 1997. Fang was never allowed back in. Wei has yet to be. More recently, a de facto banishment within the country happened to outspoken law professor He Weifang of Beijing University. Peter Foster, Leading Dissident 'Exiled' to Chinese Northwest, TELEGRAPH (online ed.), Mar. 11, 2009 , http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/4974333/Leading-dissident-exiled-toChinese-northwest.html. He was "reassigned" to teach for two years at an obscure school in China's remote Xinjiang region. But this was not necessarily a bad thing. While there, he seriously read ancient Chinese classics for the first time. HE, supra note 34, at 42. Regardless, Xinjiang's use as a banishment site goes back centuries. See generally JOANNA WALEY-COHEN, EXILE IN MID-QING CHINA: BANISHMENT TO XINJIANG, 1758 -1820 .
68. For more about Wei and his post-1997 activities, see BURUMA, supra note 53, at 80-107; Wei Jingsheng Foundation's website, http://www.weijingsheng.org/.
69. LIU XIAOBO, supra note 14, at 318-19 (writing in his 2009 criminal trial self-defense statement that past Chinese repressions of free speech "have come to be viewed as black marks on the records of the regimes that imposed them and as embarrassments to the Chinese nation").
70. FARBER, supra note 7, at 6.
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First Amendment [i.e., speech] . . . in this way reflects the importance of freedom of speech about other topics ranging from scientific debates to accurate commercial information in the marketplace."
71
Genuinely democratic, human rights-respecting, and rule of lawfollowing governments tolerate free speech because it furthers selfgovernance and social stability, helps the discovery of truth via the marketplace of ideas, promotes autonomy and self-realization, and fosters tolerance. 72 It is doubtful whether anyone could argue persuasively that these ends are undesirable, unreasonable, and not marks of modernity.
B. A Disharmonious Society
The PRC's current leaders need not fear public criticism of themselves and their policies by citizens. By letting citizens publicly criticize the Party, the Party could gain honest, independent feedback on what it is doing right, wrong, and ought to do. With 86 million members, the Party is the world's largest political organization. Membership is highly selective and hard to get, which explains why members make up only 6% of China's 1.37 billion citizens. 73 Tolerating political speech can help the Party truly remain in "the vanguard both of the Chinese working class and of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation" as the Party's constitution claims. 74 Silencing such speech erodes the Party's credibility 71. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 955. 72. Id. at 954-58; FARBER, supra note 7, at 3-6; BARENDT, supra note 8, at 6-23 (discussing, in addition, a fourth theory for free-speech protection: suspicion of government . Also, none of the unofficial sources I relied on that cite these numbers define whether or how "mass incidents" or "public protests" are officially defined (i.e., how many persons must be involved and what activities they must engage in to constitute an incident or protest). [To compound confusion, a senior Party member quoted in the People's Daily Online article above seemingly distinguishes (without defining) protests and incidents from public order disturbances, saying that the protests only account for a very small portion of public order disturbances and the cause of the incidents (protests? public order disturbances?) are "very complicated."] This ambiguity may be to the government's liking. Justine Zheng Ren, What is "Mass Incident"? The Categorization and Deconstruction of a Dangerous Concept, 4 CHINA ELECTIONS & GOVERNANCE REV. 12, 16-17 (2009) , available at http://www.cartercenter.org/ resources/pdfs/peace/china/CEG-review-issue4.pdf. Regardless, I think these numbers are probably official and, consequently, undercounts. Why would the government release such numbers, which, even if undercounts, are still quite damning? I spoke privately with a Chinese law professor in 2006 at an elite Beijing school who opined that the Ministry releases this information without realizing how bad it makes China look to the outside world. He appears to have been right-and the Ministry soon got wise. It has not released figures since then, when 90,000 mass incidents were reported. Yu Jianrong, Anger in the Streets, CAIJING ANN. ED. 25 (2009). Sociology professor (and doctoral supervisor of newly appointed President Xi Jinping) Sun Liping at Beijing's elite Tsinghua University estimates that 180,000 mass incidents occurred in 2010. Peter Coy et al., The Great Fall of China, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., May 7-13, 2012, at 7. And some prominent China-based academics say that number has probably doubled (to 360,000 mass incidents yearly) since 2010. Hannah Beech, Big Brotherhood, TIME, Oct. 22, 2012, at protests.
C. FS = C² > EP Does Not Add Up
Qin dynasty prime minister Li Si's ancient political equation of free speech equals chaos and confusion greater than the emperor's power (expressed mathematically as FS = C² > EP) does not add up. To fix it, put a minus sign in front of FS because this is proved by Chinese history. In the polyglot United States the applicable equation has been FS = C² < PP (PP stands for president's power because the United States has never had an emperor). Many Americans publicly criticized and denounced then-President George W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003. One of the first and most memorable, Academy Award-winning filmmaker Michael Moore, even scolded Bush on live television during the 2003 Oscars, 82 less than a week after the invasion began and more than a year before Bush's main justifications (Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and ties to al-Qaida terrorists) for waging a pre-emptive war were officially discredited, 83 as a "fictitious" president and said that the United States had been sent to war for "fictitious" reasons.
The following year, just four months before a small majority of Americans re-elected Bush, 84 Moore released Fahrenheit 9/11, an awardwinning and record-setting documentary film that harshly criticizes Bush's first term as president and mocks his pre-White House life. 85 Americans took to the streets that summer to see the movie and that fall to vote for president. But they did not kill each other, kill Bush, or bomb the White House. They spoke freely and behaved civilly for the most part. And Bush won a second term. Chinese Communist Party, take note: no matter what domestic critics say and citizens hear publicly about a top political leader or that leader's policies, that leader and his party can still win a majority of votes and legitimately stay in power.
D. Rewards of Free Speech
Tolerating free speech in the political sphere yields two valuable rewards. First, it is highly therapeutic. Citizens can say whatever is on their minds and not have to keep their thoughts pent up. This gives them a sense of being heard, participating in political processes, and shaping their own destinies. Moreover, it can reduce the likelihood of clashes growing yearly between citizens with pent-up political speech and the 320 FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 26 state. 86 The Fourth Generation recognized the value of group therapy, which is why it tolerated, perhaps encouraged, mass protests in Beijing, Shanghai, and approximately thirty-eight other Chinese cities in 2005 against Japan. 87 These protests lasted for several weeks. Some Japanese passers-by were harassed and even beaten up. After determining that protesters had let off enough steam (and in a way that could have been directed at the Chinese government instead), the government called for the protests to end. In other words, the group therapy session was over. 88 Second, it maximizes intellectual capital. The PRC seeks to turn many of its best universities like Beijing's elite Tsinghua (China's MIT) into world-class centers of learning within a decade. This involves recruiting top foreign-trained Chinese and Chinese-American specialists, setting them up in well-equipped labs, surrounding them with the smartest students, and giving them great leeway. But the political speech climate is far less open in China than in the West. Some China-based academics fear that great foreign professors publicly critical of the Party's policies will come to China for only a year or two and leave frustrated. Without young people's idealism or counterculture, where are the internal catalysts for a society to improve itself? A whole generation of pragmatic youth can be a factor for social and political stability in the short run, but in the long run they could also prove a huge liability for innovation and replenishment because there will be few to raise the bar of justice and equality or push the envelope of social progress. 
V. GRAND FINALE
A . So Long, Communist-Ruled China: 1949-201? It is extremely hard, if not impossible, to imagine the PRC in the future as a fully developed postindustrial nation capable of cultivating and attracting bold, original minds yet incapable of tolerating free speech in the political sphere. No precedent exists. Perhaps China will be the first. But the odds are unfavorable. 90 The best bet would be for the Party to begin immediately tolerating such speech. This suggestion probably strikes most readers as absurd. Why should the Party, which has held total power for sixty-five years, willingly do something that could reduce its power? Because "the world today has no septuagenarian one-party governments-and for good reason," writes professor Minxin Pei.
91
In democratic societies external incentives (voters, free press, and independent non-governmental organizations) compel political parties to transform themselves regularly. But one-party governments have neither external nor internal incentives. As the nineteenth-century British historian Lord Acton famously remarked, "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. [in 2003 ] that arise on the back of accumulated misgovernance . . . Authoritarian regimes live from crisis to crisis and there will be many more to come in China."). Perhaps the worst crisis since then occurred at 2:28 PM China Standard Time on May 12, 2008, when a 7.9 magnitude earthquake struck Sichuan province. Around 87,000 people died or were presumed dead (including over 5000 children in collapsed school buildings) and over 5 million people were left homeless. For the first few weeks after, the Chinese government surprisingly let the domestic and foreign media report freely on the disaster. But this freedom ended with the asking of tough questions about poorly 2014] CHINA downfall of authoritarian governments or their temporary preservation by declaring martial law and using the military against citizens.
B. Speak and Let Speak
The Party has a terrible record when it comes to free speech. As a result, it lacks free-speech credibility. 96. Hu, supra note 2, at 428. "When we demand freedom of speech, we are not asking the government to do anything just asking it to refrain from doing something. This is not something that requires spending money and effort, but, rather, saves money and effort." Id. See also Margaret Ng, Are Rights Culture-bound?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES: LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 59, 61-62 (Michael C. Davis ed., 1995) (distinguishing positive rights from negative rights and ranking the latter higher). I had a private discussion last decade with a Chinese law professor at an elite Beijing school about whether the government should simply let free speech happen. The professor opined that before citizens can be allowed to speak freely, the government must strengthen the rule of law. This sounds like a variation of the trendy gradualist argument advocating economic reforms ahead (or instead?) of political reforms. The gradualist approach is more myth than reality, more self-serving than altruistic. It presumes that ordinary citizens are incapable of being governed and, therefore, must be ruled by an elite that postpones them the exercise of their freedoms and rights until that elite deems those citizens are ready to exercise them at some always unspecified future date when everyone is rich and well-educated. There is no historical precedent of this ever happening, of benevolent autocrats voluntarily allowing subjects real freedoms and rights. Subjects must demand them! FANG, supra note 58, at 257; MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 91 (Signet Classics 2000) (1963) . A great Chinese scholar last century, Hu Shih (1891 Shih ( -1962 , wrote that " [t] he only way to have democracy is to have democracy." Schell, supra note 54, at 123. Similarly, I think that the only way to have free speech is to have free speech. It is not a product or distant descendant of the rule of law, but a producer and constant companion. Without it, how else can a legitimate rule of law take root and grow?
97 person can do. Once citizens realize that they will not be punished for speaking their minds on political matters, free speech will be realized. 98 The Party's credibility and legitimacy will both suffer and improve because honesty dispels myth and fosters trust. Admittedly, this means that at some point in the near future the Party will probably have to share legislative power with or peacefully transfer executive power to an opposition party. (The latter happened on the self-governed Chinese island of Taiwan in 2000 for the first time in Chinese history, and again in 2008.) But it is better to do so than to risk losing all power permanently and violently as well as jeopardizing the nation's unity and progress. In 2006 a dozen former Party officials and senior scholars-including a onetime secretary to Mao, a Party propaganda chief, and the retired bosses of some of the PRC's most powerful newspapers-issued a public letter urging more free speech. "At the turning point in our history from a totalitarian to a constitutional system," they wrote, "depriving the public of freedom of speech will bring disaster for our social and political transition and give rise to group confrontation and social unrest. Experience has proved that allowing a free flow of ideas can improve This Article ends as it began with more words by a Chinese citizen upon completing a four-year prison sentence last decade for publicly commemorating victims of the 1989 Beijing massacre, which remains twenty-five years later the most unspeakable topic in the PRC. He sums up the state of free speech at the start of the Hu-Wen administration in 2003, and asks a question still needing an affirmative and final answer today more than ever by the newly appointed Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang administration at the start of its rule:
If my own case has any special significance it is only that it forces people to face a highly embarrassing fact-the fact that even now, in the dawn of the twenty-first century, a Chinese citizen can be imprisoned for what he says. A person who merely exercises the normal human proclivity to say what he thinks comes to be viewed as a prize-winning hero. This is odd, my friends. Will it not be wonderful when, some day, every Chinese person will be able to say what is on his or her mind-without either prison or prizes, heroism or villainy, even coming into it?
